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Introduction
Any complex economic system can typically be viewed as the sum of many smaller parts; a microe-
conomic perspective starts from the smallest parts to build a solution to the whole. As mechanism
designers, we often follow this paradigm, investing considerable effort to understand the incentives
of a small part, assuming that our efforts will bear fruit in the final complex aggregation. Internet
auctions are a clear example: immeasurable effort has been expended to understand the incentives
of a single shot ad auction, and that effort has influenced countless decisions at today’s Internet
advertising platforms.
Yet, the incentives of the single shot ad auction can be a distraction. Many platforms do not allow
bids to be set at the auction level, instead restricting bidders to submit a single indicative bid
combined with a budget. The indicative bid is commonly adjusted according to the probability
the user will click or interact with the ad, then submitted to an auction as if by a proxy bidder.
When advertisers are largely constrained by their bids, incentives in a single shot auction can
have a large and predictable impact on bidder behavior. The first sponsored search platforms
are a quintessential example: Edelman and Ostrovsky (2007) showed that the pay-as-bid single
shot auction used in early implementations directly precipitated the cyclic bidding behavior seen
in practice. However, advertisers are often budget constrained, in which case their incentives will
depend heavily on the budget management system. In fact, recently in display advertising there
has been a shift towards first price auctions including Google’s AdX (Sluis, 2019) and other large ad
exchanges (Sluis, 2017). This calls into question whether, in the presence of budgets, the incentive
properties of the individual auctions—particularly truthfulness, which motivated the use of a second
price auction—are of any consequence to the overall performance of the ad platform.
Indeed, in this paper, we study the kind of pacing equilibria that would result from real-world budget
management systems and show that using a first price auction guarantees desirable theoretical
properties, many of which are not true for a second price auction. First, we show that when a first
price auction is used to sell each impression, the resulting first price pacing equilibrium (fppe) has
many theoretical guarantees that would not hold in an analogous second price pacing equilibrium
(sppe), including uniqueness and monotonicity. Second, we show that fppe are not an arbitrary
construction but correspond to the solution to the well-studied Eisenberg-Gale convex program and
are therefore efficiently computable (unlike sppe). Finally we run simulations on synthetic data to
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study the impact on incentives for advertisers. While, unsurprisingly, for non-budget-constrained
advertisers there are incentives to misreport,1 the potential value of deviation by a bidder vanishes
as the market becomes thick.
When we consider the system that collects bidders budgets and valuations as a mechanism – in
the formal sense of mechanism design – and assume bidders behave fully strategically according
to a game-theoretic solution concept, revenue equivalence tells us that we should not expect to
get something for nothing. Indeed, in the special case of a single item for sale and bidders with
sufficiently large budgets, FPPE corresponds to a simple first-price sealed-bid auction, and SPPE
to a simple second-price sealed-bid auction. Thus, under the usual assumptions, at least in this
case we should expect them to generate the same expected revenue. We thus certainly make no
claim that FPPE results in higher revenue than SPPE in fully strategic environments. On the
other hand, bidders in the real world for example in ad auctions – certainly do not qualify as
being fully strategic. While we do study incentives to misreport, most of this paper focuses on
market equilibrium concepts, rather than fully game-theoretic solution concepts for thin markets
with bidders with private information, such as Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Pacing Equilibria in Internet Advertising
Advertising has emerged as a primary method of monetization for online services, search engines,
social media platforms, etc. Since an advertising campaign is itself an aggregation of many small
advertising events, advertisers typically do not address each advertising opportunity individually,
instead relying on tools that manage ad campaigns on their behalf. The largest platforms include
comprehensive auction markets that govern the allocation of impressions—opportunities to show
ads to online users—to bidders—advertisers who pay the platform to show impressions. Typically,
advertisers specify a target set of users, as well as the price they are willing to pay for each impression
or click. They also set a budget that limits their total expenditure within a given time interval,
say during a single day. Given advertisers’ targeting criteria, bids, and budgets, the platform sets
prices and allocates impressions that respect bidders’ bids and budgets.
A na¨ıve implementation of an ad market runs an independent auction for each impression, removing
a bidder from the set of participants once her budget runs out. However, this as-soon-as-possible
1Without a constraining budget, bidders participate in (mostly) independent auctions. Since truthful reporting
guarantees 0 utility in each, there’s an incentive to misreport.
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approach has several downsides. A bidder who makes large bids but has a small budget will quickly
expend it on the first impressions that become available. From the perspective of maximizing
overall utility in the system—i.e., social welfare—this is suboptimal because the bidder will likely
win generic impressions of interest to many other bidders instead of winning specific impressions
that the bidder uniquely values. Similarly, this is suboptimal for the bidder because the increased
competition on generic impressions will induce higher prices, leading to lower utility than if the
bidder had bought specific impressions.
There are two broad approaches to taking budgets into consideration: bidder selection and bid
modification. The goal in bidder selection is to choose a subset of participants for each auction,
from the set of bidders whose budgets have not been exhausted, in a way that optimizes the use
of bidders’ overall budgets. This has been considered in both first and second price settings. In
the context of first price auctions, the celebrated work of Mehta et al. (2007) gives an algorithm
for online allocation of impressions to bidders to maximize overall ad revenue. Their allocation
algorithm, and those in the large body of follow-up work (see the survey in Mehta (2013)), can be
interpreted as running a first price auction for each impression after removing a subset of bidders
from the auction based on their remaining budgets. Bidder selection has also been explored in the
context of Generalized Second Price (GSP) auctions, particularly for multi-objective optimization
in search engines (Abrams et al., 2008; Azar et al., 2009; Goel et al., 2010; Karande, Mehta,
and Srikant, 2013). An important feature of bidder selection is that a bidder who is chosen to
participate in the auction does so with her original bid, i.e., the platform does not modify bid
values of participating bidders.
Our current paper focuses on bid modification, wherein the platform shades an advertiser’s bids
in order to preserve her budget for the future. This is commonly implemented by scaling an
advertiser’s bid by a pacing multiplier (of value < 1). Many ad platforms provide a free option to
advertisers to automatically have their bids scaled, and an impressive body of work has focused
on advertiser strategies for bid modification in order to maximize their ROI (Rusmevichientong
and Williamson, 2006; Feldman et al., 2007; Hosanagar and Cherepanov, 2008). In addition to
advertiser strategies, Cary et al. (2007) also studies the limit point if all advertisers participate
in a repeated position auction. In that setting, prices converge to VCG prices, but there is no
heterogeneity in impression opportunities. Closest to our work is that of Borgs et al. (2007) who
study first-price auctions with budget constraints in a perturbed model. They show that in the
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limit of their perturbations, prices converge to those of an (equal-rates) competitive equilibrium.
The limit point they describe is an fppe, hence this shows guaranteed existence and the relation
to competitive equilibria. It leaves open the question of uniqueness, revenue, and other properties
of fppe. They also point out a convex set of constraints that can be used to compute this limit
point, and thus an fppe.
Recent work has studied pacing equilibria in the context of second-price auctions: Balseiro, Bes-
bes, and Weintraub (2015) investigate budget-management in auctions through a fluid mean-field
approximation, which leads to elegant existence results and closed-form descriptions of equilibria
in certain settings. Balseiro et al. (2017) studies several budget smoothing methods including mul-
tiplicative pacing in a stochastic context where ties do not occur; Balseiro and Gur (2019) studies
how an individual bidder might adapt their pacing multiplier over time in a stochastic continuous
setting; Conitzer et al. (2018) studies second price pacing when bidders, goods, budgets, and val-
uations are known, and proves that equilibria exist under fractional allocations. In this paper, we
study pacing in the context of first price auctions. While second price auctions displaced first price
auctions in Internet advertising because of their many desirable robustness guarantees, particularly
related to stability (Edelman and Ostrovsky, 2007) and strategyproofness, first price auctions are
regaining popularity because they are simple to operate and offer a degree of transparency and
ease of use that second price auctions do not (Chen, 2017; Sluis, 2017). In the context of position
auctions, Du¨tting, Fischer, and Parkes (2018) further showed that first price does not suffer from
the same equilibrium selection problems that GSP and VCG does. Moreover, as we will see later,
first price auctions provide a clean characterization of equilibrium solutions in the context of pacing,
unlike in the case of second price auctions (Conitzer et al., 2018). Indeed, as stated earlier, perhaps
the most robust literature in ad auctions relates to bidder selection in first price auctions (Mehta,
2013). Our work complements this line of work by focusing on bid modification instead of bidder
selection as the preferred method for budget management.2
2In Mehta et al. (2007) and most other related papers, bidder selection is performed by using a “scaling parameter”
for bids based on remaining budgets, but once the winner of an auction is selected, she pays her entire (unscaled) bid
for the impression. In contrast, in our work, the individual bids are scaled using the respective pacing multipliers,
and the winner pays the scaled bid instead of her original bid for the impression. Another point of difference is that
the scaling multiplier changes from one impression to the next in the budgeted allocation literature since it is only a
tool for winner selection, whereas we choose a single pacing multiplier for a bidder that is used to scale her bids for
all the impressions in the problem instance.
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Contributions
We are given a set of bidders, goods, valuations, and budgets. A first price auction is conducted
for each individual good. All bidders participate in every auction, but we are allowed to choose
per-bidder pacing multipliers αi that scale their bids. A set of pacing multipliers is said to be budget
feasible (abbreviated bfpm) if no bidder’s total payments exceeds her budget. We say that a set
of bfpm is maximal if they dominate any other bfpm. Furthermore, we say that a set of bfpm
yields a pacing equilibrium if the pacing multipliers are simultaneously optimal for all bidders in
the following sense: every bidder either spends her entire budget or her pacing multiplier is set to 1.
We will allow goods to be allocated fractionally if there are ties; this is well-motivated in, e.g.,
the ad-auction setting, where goods may consist of thousands of impressions. Note that pacing
equilibria can be defined in both first and second price settings—we abbreviate these respectively
by fppe and sppe. The goal of this paper is to characterize fppe, study their properties, and
design algorithms to find them.
Existence and Uniqueness. From Borgs et al. (2007) it follows that fppe are guaranteed to exist.
Our first result shows that not only does an fppe always exist, but also that it is essentially
unique.3 In fact, we show that the fppe exactly coincides with the (unique) maximal set of pacing
multipliers. This also leads to the observation that the fppe is revenue-maximizing among all
bfpm. Our structural characterization of fppe in terms of bfpm is a powerful tool for reasoning
about properties of FPPE: we use it to show several results, and it was used in follow-up work
on competitive equilibria from equal incomes (Peysakhovich and Kroer, 2019). Furthermore, we
also show that the fppe yields a competitive equilibrium, i.e., every bidder is exactly allocated her
demand set. It is worth noting the contrast with sppe, which are not unique in general (Conitzer
et al., 2018).
Computability. We show an interesting connection between fppe and a generalization of the classi-
cal Eisenberg-Gale (eg) convex program for quasi-linear utilities (Cole et al., 2017). Using Fenchel
duality, we use the eg program to infer that the unique maximal bfpm, which is also revenue maxi-
mizing, yields the unique fppe. Moreover, this connection with the eg program immediately yields
a (weakly) polynomial algorithm to compute the fppe. This also contrasts with sppe, for which
maximizing revenue (or other objectives like social welfare) is known to be NP-hard (Conitzer et
3More precisely, pacing multipliers are unique but there may be different equivalent allocations due to tie breaking.
Tie breaking does not impact revenue, social welfare or individual utilities.
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al., 2018). Indeed, no polynomial-time algorithm is known for even finding an arbitrary pacing
equilibrium in the second price setting. While Borgs et al. (2007) already showed a convex pro-
gram, this connection to Eisenberg-Gale is important because it lends itself to scalable first-order
methods (Nesterov and Shikhman, 2018; Kroer et al., 2019).
Monotonicity and Sensitivity: We show that fppe satisfies many notions of monotonicity, both
in terms of revenue and social welfare. Adding an additional good weakly increases both revenue
and social welfare, and adding a bidder or increasing a bidder’s budget weakly increases revenue.
Note that this also distinguishes fppe from sppe, which generally do not satisfy such monotonicity
conditions.
In fact, not only is the revenue obtained in an fppe monotonically non-decreasing with increasing
budgets, but it also changes smoothly in the sense that increasing the budget by some ∆ can only
increase the revenue by ∆. Again, this does not hold in sppe where the revenue can increase by a
substantial amount even for a small change in the budgets.
Shill-proofness: Using monotonicity, we also establish that there is no incentive for the provider to
enter fake bids (shill-proof), unlike in sppe.
Simulations: Using the EG convex program we perform simulations on synthetic data. We find
that the ex-post regret associated with fppe gets low quickly as markets get thick, especially when
bidders can only change the scale of their utilities, as is usually the case in ad markets when bidding
on conversions (e.g. clicks). We furthermore show that even with just a bit of market thickness,
bidders have no incentive to misreport budgets in order to shift the fppe outcome. Finally, we
compare fppe and sppe revenue and social welfare across instances. We find that fppe always has
better revenue, while welfare splits evenly on which solution concept performs better.
First-price Pacing Equilibria
We consider a single-slot auction market in which a set of bidders N = {1, . . . , n} target a set of
(divisible) goods M = {1, . . . ,m}. Each bidder i has a valuation vij ≥ 0 for each good j, and a
budget Bi > 0 to be spent across all goods. We assume that the goods are sold through independent
(single slot) first-price auctions, and the valuations and budgets are assumed to be known to the
auctioneer. When multiple bids are tied for an item, we assume that the item can be fractionally
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allocated, and we allow the auctioneer to choose the fractional allocation (although our later results
on equivalence to competitive equilibrium show that the fractional choices made by the auctioneer
are optimal for the bidders as well).
The goal is to compute a vector of pacing multipliers α that smooths out the spending of each bidder
so that they stay within budget. A pacing multiplier for a bidder i is a real number αi ∈ [0, 1] that
is used to scale down the bids across all auctions: for any i, j, bidder i participates in the auction
for good j with a bid equal to αivij ; we refer to these bids as multiplicatively paced. We define
feasibility as follows:
Definition 1. A set of budget-feasible first-price pacing multipliers (bfpm) is a tuple (α, x), of
pacing multipliers αi ∈ [0, 1] for each bidder i ∈ N , and fractional allocation xij ∈ [0, 1] for bidder
i ∈ N and good j ∈M with the following properties:
• (Prices) Unit price pj = maxi∈N αivij for goods j ∈M .
• (Goods go to highest bidders) If xij > 0, then αivij = maxi′∈N αi′vi′j for each bidder i ∈ N
and good j ∈M .
• (Budget-feasible) ∑j∈M xij · pj ≤ Bi for bidders i ∈ N .
• (Demanded goods sold completely) If pj > 0, then
∑
i∈N xij = 1 for each good j ∈M .
• (No overselling) ∑i∈N xij ≤ 1 for each good j ∈M .
Within the feasible space, we are particularly interested in outcomes that are stable in some sense.
Specifically, we are interested in solutions where no bidder is unnecessarily paced, which we call
first-price pacing equilibria (fppe).
Definition 2. A first-price pacing equilibrium (fppe) is a bfpm tuple (α, x), of pacing multipliers
αi for each bidder i, and fractional allocation xij for bidder i and good j with this additional
property:
• (No unnecessary pacing) If ∑j∈M xijpj < Bi, then αi = 1 for each bidder i ∈ N .
Existence, uniqueness, and structure of fppe
Borgs et al. (2007) show that fppe are guaranteed to exist. We show that not only are fppe
guaranteed to exist, but that they are also unique and maximize the seller’s revenue over all bfpm.
In the following, the inequality symbols are component-wise.
8
Lemma 1. There exists a Pareto-dominant bfpm (α, x) (i.e., α ≥ α′ component-wise for any other
bfpm (α′, x′)).
Proof. First, we will show that given any two bfpm (α(1), x(1)) and (α(2), x(2)), there exists a bfpm
with pacing multipliers α∗ = max(α(1), α(2)) that are the component-wise maximum of α(1) and
α(2). Note that, on each item, the resulting paced bid for a bidder is the higher of her two paced
bids on this item in the original two bfpms. Let the corresponding allocation x∗ be: for each
good j, identify which of the two bfpms had the highest paced bid for j, breaking ties towards
the first bfpm; then, allocate the good to the same bidder as in that bfpm (if the good was split
between multiple bidders, allocate it in the same proportions), at the same price. Note that these
prices coincide with the winning bidders’ paced bids in the new solution. Thus, we charge the
correct prices, goods go to the highest bidders, demanded goods are sold completely, and there is
no overselling.
All that remains to be verified is that the new solution is budget-feasible. Consider bidder i in the
bidder-wise-max α∗. In either α(1) or α(2), bidder i had the exact same multiplier—say it was in
α(b) for b ∈ {1, 2} (breaking ties towards 1). To show budget feasibility, we now prove the following:
if a bidder i wins fraction x of an item j in (α∗, x∗), then she must also win at least fraction x
of item j in (α(b), x(b)). The key observation is that for any bidder and item, her paced bid in
(α∗, x∗) is at least as much as her paced bid in either (α(1), x(1)) or (α(2), x(2))—we call this the
monotone property. Now, consider two situations. First, if i did not have the highest bid on an
item j in (α(b), x(b)), then the bidder who had a higher bid in (α(b), x(b)) continues to have a higher
bid in (α∗, x∗) by the monotone property. Hence, i does not win this item under (α∗, x∗). Second,
suppose i did have the highest bid on an item j in (α(b), x(b)), and won a fraction x of the item. In
this case, every other bidder who matched i’s bid in (α(b), x(b)) continues to have at least as high
a bid in (α∗, x∗) by the monotone property. Therefore, i shares item j in (α∗, x∗) with at least
the set of bidders she shared it with in (α(b), x(b)). There are three further subcases. First, if the
highest paced bid for j is unique, then the highest must be achieved by (α(b), x(b)); in this case,
i gets exactly fraction x of item j. Second, if the highest paced bid for j is tied and b = 1, then
item j is divided exactly as in (α(1), x(1)). Again, i gets exactly fraction x of item j. Third, if
the highest paced bid for j is tied but b = 2, then we claim that i does not get item j in (α∗, x∗).
This is because the allocation of j under (α∗, x∗) is identical to that under (α(1), x(1)), but since
b = 2, we have α
(1)
i < α
(2)
i which implies that i does not have the highest bid for j in (α
(1), x(1)).
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In summary, in any of these three cases, the fraction of item j that bidder i wins under (α∗, x∗) is
at most the fraction she wins under (α(b), x(b)). As a consequence, i spends no more under the new
bfpm than under bfpm b, which is budget-feasible. Hence, the new bfpm is budget-feasible.
We now complete the proof. Let α∗i = sup{αi | α is part of a bfpm}. We will show that α∗ is part
of a bfpm, proving the result. For any  > 0 and any i, there exists a bfpm where αi > α
∗
i − .
By repeatedly taking the component-wise maximum for different pairs of i, we conclude there is
a single bfpm (α, x) such that for every i, αi > α
∗
i − . Because the space of combinations of
multipliers and allocations is compact, the sequence (α, x) (as  → 0) has a limit point (α∗, x∗).
This limit point satisfies all the properties of a bfpm by continuity.
In addition to there being a maximal set of pacing multipliers over all bfpm, this maximal bfpm
is actually an fppe.
Lemma 2 (Guaranteed existence of fppe). The Pareto-dominant bfpm (α, x) with maximal pacing
multipliers α has no unnecessarily paced bidders, so it forms a fppe.
Proof. Suppose bidder i is unnecessarily paced under the maximal bfpm (α, x). If i is not tied for
any good, then we can increase her pacing multiplier by a sufficiently small  > 0 such that i is still
not tied for any item and is within budget, contradicting the fact that α was maximal. So bidder
i must be tied for at least one good. Define N(i) as all the bidders that are tied for any good with
bidder i, i.e., N(i) = {bidder k : ∃ good j with αi ·vij = αk ·vkj}. Now take the transitive closure
T of this set N(i), i.e., include all bidders who are tied for an item with a bidder in N(i), etc. Next,
redistribute the items that are tied such that none of the bidders in T is budget constrained, while
still allocating items completely. This is always possible since we can slightly increase the share of
i for all items she is tied on, while simultaneously reducing the share of all other bidders tied with
her. In the next step, we can slightly increase the share of all these bidder for other items they
are tied on while reducing the share of the new bidders they are tied with for those items, and so
on. Next, increase the pacing multipliers of all bidders in T by a small enough δ > 0 so that all
bidders in T are still not budget-constrained, and no new ties are created; call this set of pacing
multipliers α′ and the redistribution of goods x′. This contradicts that α was the maximal bfpm
to begin with, as (α′, x′) is a bfpm yet it has pacing multipliers that are higher than in (α, x).
The converse of Lemma 2 is also true: any bfpm for which at least one bidder has a pacing multiplier
αi lower than the maximal bfpm must have an unnecessarily paced bidder.
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Lemma 3. Consider two bfpm (α(1), x(1)) and (α(2), x(2)), where α(1) ≥ α(2) and α(1)i > α(2)i for
some bidder i. Then, (α(2), x(2)) must have an unnecessarily paced bidder.
Proof. Consider the set I of all bidders whose pacing multipliers are strictly lower in α(2) than in
α(1) (by definition there must be at least one bidder in this set). Collectively, I wins fewer (or the
same) items under α(2) than under α(1) (the bids from outside I have stayed the same, those from
I have gone down), and at lower prices. Since (α(1), x(1)) was budget feasible, I was not breaking
its collective budget before. Since I is spending strictly less, at least some bidder must not spend
their entire budget and thus is unnecessarily paced.
This implies that the pacing multipliers of fppe are uniquely determined.
Corollary 1 (Essential Uniqueness). The pacing multipliers of any fppe are uniquely determined
and correspond to the pacing multipliers of the maximal bfpm.
While the pacing multipliers are uniquely determined, the allocation is not: Tie-breaking may give
different goods to different bidders. However, tie-breaking is inconsequential in the sense that the
bidder utilities (and thus social welfare), item prices (and thus revenue), and the set of budget
constrained bidders, are all uniquely determined.
Given two bfpm, if the pacing multipliers of one dominate the other, then the revenue of that bfpm
must also be at least as high. In the following, let Rev(α, x) refer to the revenue of a bfpm (α, x).
Lemma 4. Given two bfpm (α(1), x(1)) and (α(2), x(2)), where α(1) ≥ α(2), we must have that
Rev(α(1), x(1)) ≥ Rev(α(2), x(2)).
Proof. Since α(1) ≥ α(2), prices under (α(1), x(1)) must be at least as large as under (α(2), x(2)). By
the definition of bfpm, all demanded items must be sold completely. Therefore, under (α(1), x(1))
we sell at least all the items that we sold under (α(2), x(2)) at prices that are at least as high as
those under (α(2), x(2)). Hence, Rev(α(1), x(1)) ≥ Rev(α(2), x(2)).
Corollary 2 (Revenue-maximizing). The fppe is revenue-maximizing among all bfpm.
The following theorem summarizes the main properties of FPPE that follow from the results in
this section:
Theorem 1. Given input (N,M, V,B), an fppe is guaranteed to exist. In addition, the uniquely-
determined maximal pacing multipliers α maximize the revenue over all bfpm.
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Proof. Follows from Lemma 2 and Corollaries 1 and 2.
Properties of First-Price Pacing Equilibria
We first show that an fppe is also a competitive equilibrium. In fact, we show that the concept of
fppe is equivalent to a natural refinement of competitive equilibrium.
Definition 3. A competitive equilibrium consists of prices pj of goods and feasible allocations xij
of goods to bidders such that the following properties hold:
1. Each bidder maximizes her utility under the given prices, that is, for every i it holds that
xi ∈ arg maxxi∈[0,1]m:∑j pjxij≤Bi{∑j(vij − pj)xij}.
2. Every item with a positive price is sold completely, that is, for all j, pj > 0⇒
∑
i xij = 1.
We now introduce a refinement of competitive equilibrium that requires that each individual dollar
that a bidder has is spent (or not spent) in a way that maximizes the utility obtained by the bidder
for that dollar. Thus, there exists a rate βi for each bidder that indicates her return on a dollar.
Definition 4. An equal-rates competitive equilibrium (erce) is a competitive equilibrium such
that for every bidder i, there is a number βi such that:
1. If xij > 0, then vij/pj = βi.
2. If i does not spend her entire budget, then βi = 1.
We obtain the following characterization of fppe.
Theorem 2. A combination of prices pj and allocations xij is an erce if and only if it is an fppe.
Proof. We first note that budget feasibility, the no-overselling condition, and the condition that
items with a positive price must be sold completely, appear in the definitions of both concepts, so
we only need to check the other conditions.
We first prove that an fppe is also an erce. Let βi = 1/αi. First, consider a bidder with αi = 1.
If xij > 0 for some j, then vij/pj = vij/vij = 1 = βi, proving both conditions in the definition of an
erce. Moreover, for any item j, we have vij/pj ≤ vij/vij = 1. Therefore, the bidder is spending
optimally given the prices.
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Next, consider a bidder with αi < 1. If xij > 0 for some j, then vij/pj = vij/(αivij) = βi, proving
the first condition in the definition of an erce. Moreover, by the definition of fppe, such a bidder
must spend her entire budget, proving the second condition. Moreover, for any item j, we have
vij/pj ≤ vij/(αivij) = βi. Hence, the bidder is spending all her budget on the optimal items for
her, and leaving money unspent would be suboptimal because βi > 1. Therefore, the bidder is
spending optimally given the prices. We conclude that an fppe is also an erce.
We next prove that an erce is also an fppe. For a bidder i with
∑
j xij > 0, consider the set
of items Si = {j : xij > 0}. By the erce property, we have that for j ∈ Si, vij/pj = βi. Let
αi = 1/βi. We must have αi ≤ 1, because otherwise i’s dollars would be better left unspent,
contradicting the first property of competitive equilibrium. Also, if αi < 1 then all of i’s budget
must be spent, establishing that no bidder is unnecessarily paced. For a bidder with
∑
j xij = 0,
define αi = βi = 1.
Now, we show that no part of an item j can be won by a bidder i for whom αivij is not maximal;
if it were, by the first erce condition we would have vij/pj = βi ⇔ αivij = pj and another bidder
i′ for whom αi′vi′j > αivij = pj . Hence, vi′j/pj > 1/αi′ = βi′ , but this would contradict that i′ is
receiving an optimal allocation under the prices.
Next, we prove that the prices are set correctly for an fppe. For any item j, if it is sold completely,
consider a bidder with xij > 0. Again, by the first erce condition we have vij/pj = βi ⇔ αivij =
pj , and we have already established that this bidder must maximize αivij . If the item is not
entirely sold, then by the second condition of competitive equilibrium it must have price 0. This
in turn implies that all bidders have value 0 for it, for otherwise there would be a bidder i with
βi = vij/pj =∞, who hence should be able to obtain a utility of ∞ since every one of the bidder’s
dollars must result in that amount of utility for her—but this is clearly impossible with finitely
many resources. Thus, we have established all the conditions of an fppe.
Next, we show that, unlike with second-price payments, under fppe the seller does not benefit from
adding fake bids.
Definition 5. A solution concept is shill-proof if the seller does not benefit from adding fake bids.
Proposition 1. fppe are shill-proof.
Proof. Note that if we start from an fppe and remove both a bidder and the items she wins, we
still have an fppe, since the remaining bidders are spending the same as before, and the remaining
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items are allocated as before and thus fully allocated. Consider an instance of a market with three
fppe: (a) an fppe with shill bids, (b) an fppe without shill bids, and (c) the fppe generated by
removing both the shill bids and the items they won from (a). Notice that the seller makes the
same revenue in (a) and (c). Moreover, by Proposition 3 we know that the revenue of (b) is at least
as much as the revenue of (c), and therefore also at least as much as the revenue of (a). Thus, the
seller cannot benefit from shill bids.
In Akbarpour and Li (2018), it is observed that a first-price single-item auction is also credible, in
the sense that the seller/auctioneer cannot benefit from lying about what other agents have done
in the mechanism. However, fppe do not satisfy this property.
Example 1. Suppose B1 = 2, v11 = 2, v12 = 2 and v22 = 1. The fppe sets p1 = p2 = 1 and
allocates both items to bidder 1. But the auctioneer could lie to bidder 1 claiming that someone
else had bid 3 for item 2, and charge bidder 1 a price of 2 for item 1. Meanwhile, she could charge
bidder 2 a price of 1 for item 2, for a higher revenue overall.
An fppe does have a price predictability guarantee: given any allocation, a bidder either pays its full
value or pays her budget. Even though individual item prices may not be known, this guarantees
a degree of transparency to bidders about the price they will pay.
An fppe is also robust to deviations by groups of bidders:
Definition 6. An allocation with a set of payments is in the core if no group of bidders has an
incentive to form a coaltion with the seller to attain an outcome that is strictly better for all agents
in the coalition.
Proposition 2. An fppe is in the core.
Proof. Since an fppe is a competitive equilibrium, if we treat money as a good then we have a
traditional locally non-satiated Walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy. Since a locally
non-satiated Walrasian Equilibrium is in the core, an fppe is also in the core.
Monotonicity and Sensitivity Analysis
We showed that fppes are guaranteed to exist, that they are unique (up to tiebreaking that is
largely inconsequential), and that they satisfy a number of attractive properties. We now look at
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Add Bidder Add Good Incr. Budget Incr. Value vij
Revenue ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 Can go down
Social Welfare Can go down ≥ 0 Can go down Can go down
Table 1: Overview of monotonicity results.
how well-behaved fppe is under changing conditions. We would ideally like the solution concept
to be stable, so that changes in the input do not produce disproportionate changes in the output.
We will show that this is largely the case. This is in contrast to sppe, where Conitzer et al. (2018)
showed that the equilibrium can be very sensitive: First, sppe is not unique, and the revenue and
welfare can vary drastically across equilibria. Second, even when there is a unique sppe, small
changes in the budget can cause disproportionately large changes in revenue.
Monotonicity
We investigate whether fppe is monotonic when adding bidders or goods, or when increasing
budgets or valuations. Table 1 summarizes our results.
Revenue Revenue monotonicity is maintained for adding bidders, goods, and budget, but not
incremental additions to valuations. Our proofs of revenue monotonicity all rely on Corollary 2:
the fact that multipliers in an fppe are maximal among bfpms. Bidder and budget monotonicity
both follow from a particularly simple argument: the original solution remains a bfpm, and thus
by maximality of fppe over bfpms monotonicity is maintained.
Proposition 3. In fppe, adding a good weakly increases revenue.
Proof. Let (α, x) be the fppe for N , M , and let (α′, x′) be the fppe for N , M ∪{j} which includes
the new good j 6∈M . We first prove that α′i ≤ αi for all bidders i ∈ N : Suppose there are bidders
whose multipliers go up (strictly); consider the set of all such bidders S. Collectively, these bidders
are now winning weakly more goods (because there are more goods and nobody else’s (paced) bids
went up). That means they are, collectively, paying strictly more (it’s first price and they’re bidding
higher). But this is impossible, because all of them were running out of budget before (since they
were paced).
Using the fact that α ≥ α′, any bidder who was paced in α is still paced in α′ and spending her
whole budget. Let T be the set of buyers whose pacing multiplier hasn’t changed, i.e. T = {i ∈
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N | αi = α′i}. They must win weakly more items: Any item they were tied originally with bidders
outside T must now go completely to bidders in T . Additionally, bidders in T may win (part of)
the new item. Since the pacing multipliers of bidders in T did not change, their prices did not
change, hence winning weakly more items means they’re spending weakly more.
So bidders whose pacing multiplier changed are spending the same, and the remaining bidder spend
weakly more. Hence revenue is weakly higher.
Proposition 4. In fppe, adding a bidder weakly increases revenue.
Proof. Let N be the original set of bidders, i 6∈ N a new bidder, and M the set of goods. Let (α, x)
be the fppe on N and M . After adding bidder i, for each bidder k ∈ N\{i} and good j ∈ M ,
let α′k = αk and x
′
kj = xkj . Set α
′
i = xij = 0 for bidder i and good j ∈ M , to obtain (α′, x′). By
construction (α′, x′) is a bfpm, so by Lemma 2, the revenue of the fppe for N ∪ {i} and M must
be at least as high.
Proposition 5. In fppe, increasing a bidder’s budget from Bi to B
′
i > Bi weakly increases revenue.
Proof. Let (α, x) be the fppe where the budget of bidder i is still Bi. After increasing the budget to
B′i, (α, x) is still a bfpm. Therefore, by Lemma 2, the revenue of the new fppe weakly increases.
Proposition 6. In fppe, increasing a bidder i’s value for some good j from vij to v
′
ij > vij can
decrease revenue.
Proof. Consider the following instance: 2 bidders, 2 goods, v11 = 10, v12 = 5, v21 = 0, v22 = 5, with
B1 = 10, B2 = 5. The fppe will be α1 = α2 = 1, x11 = x22 = 1, x12 = x21 = 0. Both bidders are
spending their whole budget for total revenue 15.
However, consider v′12 = 10 > v12. The fppe is now α1 =
1
2 , α2 = 1, x11 = x22 = 1, x12 = x21 = 0.
The bidders still receive the same goods, but the price for the first good dropped to 5 for total
revenue of 10 instead of 15.
Social Welfare For social welfare, monotonicity is only maintained for goods. Adding bidders, or
increasing budgets or valuations, can lead to drops in social welfare. The cause of non-monotonicity
is that there can be a mismatch between valuation and budget: a high-value but low-budget bidder
can be lose out to a low-value high-budget bidder.
Proposition 7. In fppe, adding a bidder can decrease social welfare by a factor 12 .
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Proof. Consider the following instance: 1 bidder, 1 good. We have v11 = K for some parameter
K > 2 and B1 = 1. The fppe is α1 = 1/K, x11 = 1 for social welfare K.
Now add bidder 2 with v21 = 2, B2 = 1. The new fppe is a1 =
2
K , a2 = 1 and x11 = x21 =
1
2 .
Social welfare now is K2 +
1
2 . As K →∞, the new social welfare is half of what it was before.
Proposition 8. In fppe, adding a good weakly increases social welfare.
Proof. Fix N , M , and additional good j 6∈ M . Let (α, x) be the fppe for N and M , (α′, x′) the
fppe for N,M ∪ {j} and let S be the set of bidders who are paced in (α, x), i.e. S = {i | αi < 1}.
We’ll compare the contribution to social welfare of S and N\S separately.
First the set S. From the proof of Proposition 3, adding a good weakly decreases pacing multipliers.
Since the bidders in S spent their entire budget in (α, x), they must also spend their entire budget
in (α′, x′). The bang-per-buck of bidder i is 1αi , since by Definition 1 they pay αi · vij per unit of
good j, and they receive vij of value per unit of good j. Since pacing multipliers weakly decreased,
the bang-per-buck of bidders in S weakly increased, and as they spend their entire budget, their
contribution to social welfare weakly increased.
Now the set N\S. By Proposition 3, the total revenue weakly increased. Since the bidders in S
spend exactly the same amount as before, the increase in revenue must have come from bidders
in N\S. Moreover, they were unpaced in (α, x) and so had a bang-for-buck of 1. In (α′, x′), they
have back-for-buck at least 1, hence their contribution to social welfare weakly increased.
Since the contribution to social welfare weakly increased for both sets S and N\S, the total social
welfare weakly increased.
Proposition 9. In fppe, increasing a bidder’s budget from Bi to B
′
i > Bi can decrease social
welfare.
Proof. Consider the following instance (which is similar to the one in Proposition 7): 2 bidders,
1 good. We have values v11 = K, v21 = 2 and budgets B1 = B2 = 1. The fppe is a1 =
2
K , s2 =
1, x11 = x21 =
1
2 for total social welfare of
K
2 +
1
2 .
Now increase bidder 2’s budget to B′2 = 2. The new fppe is a1 =
3
K , s2 = 1, x11 =
1
3 , x21 =
2
3 for
total social welfare of K3 +
2
3 . As K →∞, we lose 16 of the social welfare.
Proposition 10. In fppe, increasing a bidder i’s value for some good j from vij to v
′
ij > vij can
decrease social welfare.
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Maximal Decrease Maximal Increase
Revenue (additive) 0 ∆
Social Welfare (relative) 1−∆−∆
2
1+∆ 1 + ∆
Table 2: Overview of sensitivity results. For revenue, the number is the upper bound on change in
revenue as a result of increasing a bidder’s budget by ∆, i.e. B′i = Bi + ∆. For social welfare, the
number is the upper bound on relative change in social welfare as a result of a relative increase in
budget of 1 + ∆, i.e. B′i = (1 + ∆) ·Bi.
Proof. Consider the following instance: 2 bidders, 1 good. We have values v11 = K, v21 = 1, and
budgets B1 =
1
2 , B2 = 2. The fppe is a1 =
1
K , a2 = 1 and x11 = x21 =
1
2 , for total social welfare
k+1
2 . Now increase v
′
21 = 2. The new fppe will have a1 =
2
K , a2 = 1, and x11 =
1
4 , x21 =
3
4 for
social welfare of k+34 , as K →∞ we lose 12 of the social welfare.
Sensitivity Analysis
We now investigate the sensitivity of fppe to budget changes. An overview of our results is shown
in Table 2. When adding ∆ to the budget of a bidder, revenue can only increase, and at most
by ∆. This shows that fppe is, in a sense, revenue (and thus paced-welfare) stable with respect to
budget changes: the change in revenue is at most the same as the change in budget. In contrast to
this, Conitzer et al. (2018) show that in SPPE revenue can change drastically, at least by a factor
of 100.
Due to the nature of multiplicative pacing, additive bounds for social welfare (such as the ones
given for revenue) do not immediately make sense.4 Therefore, we focus on sensitivity results for a
relative change in budget, leading to a relative change in social welfare.
Our social welfare proofs rely on the fact that when a budget changes by factor 1 + ∆, pacing
multipliers can only change by at most a factor 1 + ∆.
Lemma 5. In fppe, changing one bidder’s budget B′i = (1 + ∆)Bi for ∆ ≥ 0, yields fppe (α′, x′)
with α ≤ α′ ≤ (1 + ∆)α.
Proof. Fix instance (N,M, V,B) with fppe (α, x), let B′i = (1 + ∆)Bi and let (α
′, x′) be the fppe
for (N,M, V,B′). Note that (α, x) is a bfpm for (N,M, V,B′), so by Corollary 1 α ≤ α′. For
4To see why, take any instance (N,M, V,B) with budget-constrained bidders and compare it with an instance
(N,M, 2V,B) where the valuations are multiplied by 2. Changing a budget will yield the same allocation for both
instances (and pacing multipliers are precisely a factor 2 off), but the change in social welfare will be twice as large
in the second instance.
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the other inequality, note that ( α
′
1+∆ , x
′), forms a bfpm for the original instance (N,M, V,B): all
prices drop by exactly a factor 11+∆ , which means that with the same allocation x
′, spend for all
bidders goes down by a factor 11+∆ so no bidder exceeds their budget. By Corollary 1 the pacing
multipliers α of the fppe on (N,M, V,B′) can only be higher, yielding α ≥ α′1+∆ . Rearranging
yields the claim.
To complete the proofs for social welfare, note that in an fppe, pacing multipliers correspond to the
bang-for-buck of buyers (i.e., the ratio between value and spend), so the bound in revenue change
implies a bound in social welfare change.
Proposition 11. In fppe, increasing a bidder i’s budget by ∆, i.e. B′i = Bi + ∆, yields a revenue
increase of at most ∆.
Proof. Fix instance (N,M, V,B), and let B′ be the budget profile where B′i = Bi + ∆ for some
bidder i. Let (α, x) be the fppe on (N,M, V,B), and let (α′, x′) be the fppe on (N,M, V,B′).
Since (α, x) is a bfpm for the new instance, we have α′ ≥ α, the new pacing multipliers are weakly
higher than the old pacing multipliers. Let S+ be the bidders for whom α′k > αk, and let Rev
old
S+
be the revenue from them in (α, x). Since the pacing multipliers for all bidders in S+ strictly
increased, they must have had αk < 1, so by the definition of a fppe they must have spent their
entire budget and RevoldS+ =
∑
k∈S+ Bk. In the new fppe, they can’t spend more than their budget,
so RevnewS+ ≤
∑
k∈S+ B
′
k ≤
(∑
k∈S+ Bk
)
+ ∆ = RevoldS+ + ∆.
What’s left to show is that the revenue from the bidders S− with α′k = αk cannot have gone up.
If there were any goods that S+ and S− were tied for, then after increasing the pacing multipliers
of S+, the prices of those goods increased and S+ won all of them. Moreover, the prices of goods
that S− as a set still win have not changed. Thus S− is winning a subset of the goods they won
previously at the same per-unit cost, hence their spend cannot have gone up.
Along with Proposition 5, this shows that when a bidder’s budget increases by ∆, Revnew−Revold ∈
[0,∆]. It’s not difficult to see that these extremes can also both be attained: for the lower bound,
increasing the budget of a non-budget-constrained bidder will not change the fppe, hence revenue
is unchanged. On the upper bound, take 1 bidder, 1 good, v11 = 2∆, B1 = ∆. Setting B
′
1 = Bi+ ∆
will increase revenue by ∆.
From Proposition 9 below, we know that social welfare can decrease when we increase a bidder’s
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budget. The following lemma bounds that loss. In the following, let SW old be the social welfare
prior to changing the budget, and SW new be the social welfare after changing the budget.
Proposition 12. In fppe, changing one bidder’s budget B′i = (1+∆)Bi for ∆ ≥ 0, yields SW new ≥(
1−∆−∆2
1+∆
)
SW old.
Proof. Let i be the bidder with B′i = (1 + ∆)Bi. Let (α, x) be the fppe before the change, and let
(α′, x′) be the fppe after the budget change. Let Sp be the set of bidders who are paced in α′, and
let S1 = N\Sp the unpaced bidders. We’ll lower-bound the new revenue from Sp and S1 separately.
For the bidders in Sp, they spent their entire budget in both (α, x) and (α
′, x′): by Lemma 5 α ≤ α′
hence bidders that are paced in α′ are also paced in α and by the definition of fppe that means
they spend their entire budget. Moreover, by Lemma 5, their pacing multipliers cannot have gone
up by more than 1 + ∆, hence their bang-per-buck is at least 11+∆ that in (α, x). Combining these
statements, in (α′, x′) bidders in Sp spend at least as much as in (α, x), and their bang-per-buck
is at least 11+∆ times that in (α, x), hence their contribution to social welfare SW
new
k ≥
SW oldk
1+∆ for
each k ∈ Sp, and therefore SW newSp ≥
SW oldSp
1+∆ .
For the set S1 of bidders who are unpaced in α
′, their combined decrease in spend can be at
most ∆ · Bi: the total spend cannot have decreased by Prop 5, bidder i’s spend increased by
at most ∆ · Bi, the paced bidders (excluding bidder i) in α′ were also all paced in α so their
spend stayed constant, hence the largest possible reduction in spend by unpaced bidders in α′ is
∆ · Bi ≤ ∆ · SW old. For unpaced bidders, spend equals contribution to social welfare, so we have
SW newS1 ≥ SW oldS1 −∆ · SW old.
Combining everything, we have SW new = SW newSp + SW
new
S1
≥ SW
old
Sp
1+∆ + SW
old
S1
− ∆ · SW old ≥
SW old
1+∆ −∆ · SW old =
(
1−∆−∆2
1+∆
)
SW old.
Proposition 13. In fppe, changing one bidder’s budget B′i = (1+∆)Bi for ∆ ≥ 0, yields SW new ≤
(1 + ∆)SW old.
Proof. Let i be the bidder whose budget increases from Bi to (1 + ∆)Bi. Let (α, x) be the fppe
before the change, and (α′, x′) be the fppe after the budget change. By Lemma 5, increasing a
budget can only increase pacing multipliers. Let S+ be the set of bidders whose pacing multiplier
increased (for convenience excluding bidder i), let S− be the set who had pacing multiplier strictly
lower than 1 whose multiplier did not change, and let S1 be the set of bidders who were unpaced
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in (α, x). Let SW old be the old social welfare, and SW new the new one. Define SWi, SW+, SW−,
and SW1 as the contribution to social welfare of bidder i, bidders S+, S−, and S1 respectively.
We use extensively that at pacing multiplier αk, the spend sk = αk · SWk.
For bidder i , we have SW newi ≤ (1 + ∆)SW oldi . The pacing multiplier of i can only have increased,
so the bang-for-buck can only have decreased. Spend increased at most by (1 + ∆), back-for-buck
was at most the same, hence SW cannot be more than 1 + ∆ more.
For bidders S+, we have SW
new
+ < SW
old
+ . Their spend cannot have increased as they spent their
budget completely in (α, x). Meanwhile, their bang-for-buck strictly decreased due to increasing
pacing multipliers.
For bidders S−, we have SW new− = SW old− . Since they were and are paced, they must spend their
entire budget. Since their pacing multiplier hasn’t changed, their bang-for-buck stayed the same.
Thus their contribution to SW stayed the same.
Finally, for bidders S1, we have SW
new
1 ≤ SW old1 . From the proof of prop. S4, the total spend of
bidders S− + S1 cannot have increased. Since the spend of bidders in S− must have stayed the
same, the spend of bidders in S1 cannot have increased. Since their bang-for-buck is 1, their SW
cannot have increased.
Summing over all groups: SW new = SW newi +SW
new
+ +SW
new− +SW new1 ≤ (1+∆)SW oldi +SW old+ +
SW old− + SW old1 ≤ (1 + ∆)SW old.
Algorithms via Convex Programming
We now turn to computing the fppe corresponding to an instance and adapt a well-known method
for competitive equilibria. Solutions to the Eisenberg-Gale convex program for Fisher markets with
quasi-linear utilities correspond exactly to fppe in our setting. Cole et al. (2017) give the following
primal convex program (as well as a dual not included here) for computing a solution to a Fisher
market with quasi-linear utilities.
(CP) max
x≥0,δ≥0,u
∑
i
Bi log(ui)− δi
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s.t. ui ≤
∑
j
xijvij + δi,∀i (1)
∑
i
xij ≤ 1,∀j (2)
The variables xij denote the amount of item j that bidder i wins, δi being nonzero denotes bidder i
saving some of their budget, and ui denotes a measure of utility for bidder i (exactly their utility
when δi = 0, otherwise it is not exact).
The dual variables βi, pj correspond to constraints (1) and (2), respectively. They can be interpreted
as follows: βi is the inverse bang-per-buck: minj:xij>0
pj
vij
for buyer i, and pj is the price of good j.
The leftover budget is denoted by δi, it arises from the dual program: it is the dual variable for the
dual constraint βi ≤ 1, which constrains bidder i to paying at most a cost-per-utility rate of 1. See
Cole et al. (2017) for the dual.
We now show via Fenchel duality that CP computes an fppe. Informally, the result follows because
βi specifies a single utility rate per bidder, duality guarantees that any item allocated to i has exactly
rate βi, and thus since CP is known to compute a competitive equilibrium we have shown that it
computes an erce. Theorem 2 then gives the result.
Theorem 3. An optimal solution to CP corresponds to a fppe with pacing multiplier αi = βi and
allocation xij, and vice versa.
Proof. We start by listing the primal KKT conditions:
1. Biui = βi ⇔ ui =
Bi
βi
2. βi ≤ 1
3. βi ≤ pjvij
4. xij , δi, βi, pj ≥ 0
5. pj > 0⇒
∑
i xij = 1
6. δi > 0⇒ βi = 1
7. xij > 0⇒ βi = pjvij
It is easy to see that xij is a valid allocation: CP has the exact packing constraints. Budgets are
also satisfied (here we may assume ui > 0 since otherwise budgets are satisfied since the bidder
wins no items): by KKT condition 1 and KKT condition 7 we have that for any item j that bidder
i is allocated part of:
Bi
ui
=
pj
vij
⇒ Bivijxij
ui
= pjxij
22
If δi = 0 then summing over all j gives
∑
j
pjxij = Bi
∑
j vijxij
ui
= Bi
This part of the budget argument is exactly the same as for the standard Eisenberg-Gale proof (Nisan
et al., 2007). Note that (1) always holds exactly since the objective is strictly increasing in ui. Thus
δi = 0 denotes full budget expenditure. If δi > 0 then KKT condition 6 implies that ui = Bi which
implies δi =
Bi
ui
δi. This gives:
∑
j
pjxij + δi = Bi
∑
j vijxij
ui
+
Bi
ui
δi = Bi
This shows that δi > 0 denotes the leftover budget.
If bidder i is winning some of item j (xij > 0) then KKT condition 7 implies that the price on
item j is αivij , so bidder i is paying their bid as is necessary in a first-price auction. Bidder i
is also guaranteed to be among the highest bids for item j: KKT conditions 7 and 3 guarantee
αivij = pj ≥ αi′vi′j for all i′.
Finally each bidder either spends their entire budget or is unpaced: KKT condition 6 says that if
δi > 0 (that is, some budget is leftover) then βi = αi = 1, so the bidder is unpaced.
Now we show that any FPPE satisfies the KKT conditions for CP. We set βi = αi and use the
allocation x from the FPPE. We set δi = 0 if α < 1, otherwise we set it to Bi −
∑
j xijvij . We set
ui equal to the utility of each bidder. KKT condition 1 is satisfied since each bidder either gets a
utility rate of 1 if they are unpaced and so ui = Bi or their utility rate is αi so they spend their
entire budget for utility Bi/αi. KKT condition 2 is satisfies since αi ∈ [0, 1]. KKT condition 3
is satisfied since each item bidder i wins has price-per-utility αi =
pj
vij
= βi, and every other item
has a higher price-per-utility. KKT conditions (4) and (5) are trivially satisfied by the definition
of FPPE. KKT condition 6 is satisfied by our solution construction. KKT condition 7 is satisfied
because a bidder i being allocated any amount of item j means that they have a winning bid, and
their bid is equal to vijαi.
This shows that we can use CP to compute an fppe. Cole et al. (2017) show that CP admits rational
equilibria, and thus an fppe can be computed in polynomial time with the ellipsoid method as long
as all inputs are rational. Furthermore, the relatively simple structure of CP means that it can
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easily be solved via standard convex-programming packages such as CVX (Grant and Boyd, 2008,
2014) or scalable first-order methods.
The equivalence between solutions to CP and fppe provides an alternative view on many of our
results. Since Theorem 3 can be shown directly via Fenchel duality, it allows us to prove via duality
theory that fppe corresponds to erce, and that fppe always exists. (CP is easily seen to always
be feasible and the feasible set is compact. Thus CP always has a solution. By Theorem 3 that
solution will be an fppe.)
Experiments
In previous sections, we’ve shown that fppe have many satisfying theoretical properties, such as
guaranteed existence, uniqueness, and poly-time computability. However, the question remains: if
participating in a single first-price auction has such bad incentives, what are the incentives in a
budget-managed auction market? Additionally, while fppe have nice properties compared to sppe,
how do the equilibria for first-price auctions compare to those for second-price auctions for typical
objectives like social welfare? We investigated the properties of fppe via numerical simulations. We
aimed to answer two concrete questions: (1) Under fppe, how high is bidder regret for reporting
truthfully? (2) How does fppe compare to sppe in terms of revenue and social welfare?
To investigate these questions, we generated instances according to the complete-graph model by
Conitzer et al. (2018). In this model, every bidder is interested in every item, and each valuation
is drawn i.i.d. from unif(0, 1). We generated 5 instances for each point in the Cartesian product of
2, 4, . . . , 8 bidders and 4, 6, . . . , 14 goods. For each instance, we computed an fppe as the solution
to CP, computed with CVX (Grant and Boyd, 2014). We computed an sppe for every objective
function using the MIP given by Conitzer et al. (2018). We considered at most 8 bidders and 14
goods because of the limited scalability of the sppe MIP; we were able to solve all CP instances
in less than 2ms. Figure 5 in the appendix shows the distribution of pacing multipliers; almost all
bidders are budget constrained.
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Incentive Properties
First we look at the ex-post regret that each bidder has in fppe as compared to being able to
unilaterally deviate, while keeping the fppe multipliers fixed for all other bidders. We consider
deviation either by individually setting bids in each auction, or by jointly setting bids through a
best-response pacing multiplier. The former corresponds to a setting where bidders can interact
with individual auctions. The latter corresponds to online ad-auction markets, where bidders often
only specify a value for a conversion, targeting criteria, and a budget, whereas the individual auction
valuations are based on conversion value scaled by a conversion rate (that the bidder cannot set).
Changing the value for a conversion or the budget will affect all paced bids proportionately. The
regrets are computed under the assumption that the valuations are truthful; alternatively this can
be thought as the regret that the proxy agent has for not adjusting bids or multipliers after the
fact.
The results are shown in Figure 1. The figure shows summary statistics over max relative ex-
post regret, which is the fraction of the truthful-response value that the bidder improves by if
they deviate. For each instance, for each bidder, we compute the optimal best response, subject
to budget constraints (in practice, we compute this by computing the optimal best response for
second-price auctions; the bidder could achieve this result by sufficiently shading each bid to equal
the bid of the next-highest bidder for every auction it wants to win). The max is over bidders in
the auction, and the statistic is across instances. The middle line on each box is the median; the
lower and upper hinges show the first and third quartiles. The line extending from the box shows
outliers within 1.5 times the inter-quartile range.
When the bidders are able to individually set bids in auctions the max regret is sometimes quite
high, although it goes down as market thickness increases (note that market thickness is likely
much higher in real-world auctions as compared to the at-most-10-bidder instances used here). On
the other hand, when bidders are only able to set multipliers, as is often the case in ad-auction
markets, we see that regret goes down rapidly, and already with 6-bidder instances the regret is
usually near zero. Thus fppe might indeed be an attractive solution concept for thick markets
where bidders end up with (near) best responses.
We found that bidders have low ex-post regret as soon as markets have more than a few bidders.
However another issue we may worry about is whether bidders can influence the fppe outcome itself
25
l0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
3 6 9
Number of Bidders
M
ax
 R
el
at
ive
 R
eg
re
t
(A
lte
rna
te
 B
id
s)
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
3 6 9
Number of Bidders
M
ax
 R
el
at
ive
 R
eg
re
t
(A
lte
rna
te
 M
ul
tip
lie
rs
)
Figure 1: Summary statistics over max relative ex-post regret (max taken over bidders in a given
auction, the statistic taken over the max across instances), when the bidder can choose an alternate
bid for every auction (left) or a single alternative multiplier (right).
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Figure 2: Summary statistics for when bidders can misreport their values or budget in order to
change the fppe.
by misreporting their input to the fppe computation. Figure 2 shows results for when bidders can
misreport by scaling their valuation and budgets by multipliers (λv, λb) ∈ [0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1.1]2 times
their actual amounts. Already with 4 bidders there is practically never an incentive to do this:
Only a few outlier instances have nonzero gain.
While bidders in these experiments have surprisingly low regret under fppe, all bidders were heavily
budget constrained. We thus ran some follow-up experiments to better understand how a bidder’s
regret depends on the degree to which it is budget constrained. We computed fppe on a modified
set of problem instances, which were identical to the instances in the preceding experiments, except
that all budgets were scaled up by a factor of two. We show the regret for these instances in Figure 4.
Each point is a bidder in a pacing instance. We see that bidders that are less budget-constrained
(i.e., have a higher pacing multiplier) tend to have higher regret.
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Figure 3: Summary statistics over the fppe/ sppe ratio of revenue (left) and social welfare (right).
Revenue and Welfare
Secondly we compare revenue and social welfare under fppe and sppe. The results are shown in
Figure 3. The left figure shows the cdf over the ratio of fppe revenue and sppe revenue, while
the right figure shows the cdf over the ratio of fppe welfare and sppe welfare. We see that fppe
revenue is always higher than sppe revenue, though it is the same for about 75% of instances,
and almost never more than 1.5 times as high. For welfare we find that, perhaps surprisingly,
neither solution concept is dominating, with most instances having relatively similar welfare in
either solution concept, though fppe does slightly better. There are two caveats to keep in mind
for these results: firstly we did not compute the social-welfare-maximizing sppe so it is possible
that there is a better one (although this is highly unlikely given that Conitzer et al. (2018) find that
there’s usually a single unique equilibrium in this class of instances); secondly almost every bidder
is budget constrained in the fppe of our setting, and so this might not generalize to settings where
many bidders are not budget constrained (see the appendix for statistics on multipliers in the two
solution concepts). These experiments show that fppe are not necessarily worse than sppe for
welfare (at least with nonstrategic bidders), while potentially having significantly higher revenue.
Robustness
In order to test the robustness of our results, we ran some follow-up experiments on different
problem instances. We ran on four additional instance sets. The first two sets were the sampled
graph and correlated graph from Conitzer et al. (2018). The last two sets were modifications on
the complete graph instances we used above, except with different budget scaling factors. Results
were qualitatively similar across all such instances.
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Figure 4: Relative regret as a function of fppe pacing multiplier, run on instances with budgets
scaled by a factor of 2.
Conclusion
In an ad platform, we must continually remember that the auction is only a small piece of a larger,
complex system; when setting auction rules it is not just the properties of the auction that matter,
but the platform’s consequent aggregate behavior. In this paper, we have seen that the equilibrium
properties of an ad platform in which a first-price auction is used to sell each impression are in
fact quite good, in many ways better than those when a second-price auction is used (Conitzer et
al., 2018). In settings where a sizeable fraction of bidders is not budget-constrained, incentives to
misreport remain. However, for markets where most bidders are budget-constrained, this incentive
quickly disappears.
In retrospect, the benefits of using a first-price auction are not surprising. In simple settings,
second-price auctions win most theoretical head-to-head contests over first-price auctions; however,
it is well-known that the luster of the second price auction fades as it is generalized to a Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction, so much that VCG earned the title “lovely but lonely” for its lack
of use in practice Ausubel and Milgrom (2006). Indeed, some of the strengths of an ad platform
based on first-price auctions are analogous to those seen in other complex auction settings Milgrom
(2004)—uniqueness of equilibria, relation to competitive equilibria and core membership, shill-
proofness and false-name-proofness, etc.—suggesting that first-price auctions may, in fact, have a
serious role to play in today’s ad marketplaces.
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Additional experimental results
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Figure 5: Left: A histogram of pacing multipliers across all bidders and all instances. As can
be seen almost all bidders are budget constrained. Right: Summary statistics over the FPPE /
SPPE ratio of paced welfare, where paced welfare is defined as welfare scaled down by the bidders
equilibrium pacing multiplier.
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Figure 6: A plot of pacing multipliers across FPPE and SPPE solutions. Each dot is a bidder in
an instance. The x-axis shows the FPPE multiplier. The y-axis shows the SPPE multiplier. The
multipliers are higher for SPPE in every instance.
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Figure 7: Regret faced by a bidder that truthfully reports bids and budgets into a first-price pacing
system, as opposed to misreporting bids (left) or budget (right) by a multiplicative factor. Each
line corresponds to a bidder in a particular pacing instance.
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Figure 8: Testing robustness of results on other instances: Complete graphs (left) and sampled
graphs (right).
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